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Abstract
During the 2000s, several states adopted laws requiring employers to verify new
employees’ eligibility to work legally in the USA. This study uses data from the 2005–2014
American Community Survey to examine how such laws affect unauthorized immigrants’
locational choices. The results indicate that having an E-Verify law reduces the number of
less-educated prime-age immigrants from Mexico and Central America—immigrants
who are likely to be unauthorized—living in a state. We find evidence that some new
migrants are diverted to other states, but also suggestive evidence that some already-
present migrants leave the country entirely.
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1 Introduction
US states and localities adopted an unprecedented number of laws regarding immi-
grants during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Many of these laws were aimed at redu-
cing the unauthorized immigrant population, with state lawmakers claiming they were
responding to inaction by the federal government. One of the most commonly adopted
laws requires employers to electronically verify new employees’ eligibility to work le-
gally in the USA. These provisions, often called “E-Verify laws” because they require
employers to use the federal E-Verify system, may reduce the number of unauthorized
immigrants living in a state by making it harder for them to find or switch jobs.
Understanding the effect of E-Verify laws on the number and locational choices of
unauthorized immigrants is important given this population’s size. About 11.3 million
unauthorized immigrants lived in the USA in 2014, accounting for 3.5 % of the US
population and more than 5 % of the labor force (Passel and Cohn 2015). Slightly more
than one quarter of immigrants living in the USA were unauthorized. Despite these
sizable numbers, the unauthorized immigrant population has shrunk in recent years.
In 2007, before the Great Recession, it totaled about 12.2 million and 30 % of all immi-
grants living in the USA.
The recession likely was the major cause of the decline in the unauthorized immi-
grant population, which fell by almost one million between 2007 and 2009. The drop
appears to have been comprised of both a decline in new arrivals and an increase in
departures from the USA (Passel et al. 2012). Stricter enforcement policies, including
implementation of E-Verify requirements in several states as well as record numbers of
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deportations and removals from the country, may also have played a role in the
unauthorized immigrant population’s drop and failure to rebound even as the economic
recovery gained steam.
Previous research generally shows that stricter enforcement policies, including state
E-Verify laws, have a negative effect on unauthorized immigrants’ labor market out-
comes. The wage penalty incurred by unauthorized immigrant workers from Mexico
rose after the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) first made it illegal to
hire unauthorized immigrants (Donato and Massey 1993). Employment and earnings
fell among unauthorized immigrants as border and interior enforcement ramped up in
the USA in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009). After
Arizona became the first state to require virtually all employers to electronically verify
new hires’ eligibility to work in the USA, wage-and-salary employment fell among non-
US citizen Hispanics there while self-employment rose (Bohn and Lofstrom 2013).
Nationwide, unauthorized immigrants’ employment and earnings tended to fall in
states that adopted E-Verify laws, although there is also some evidence of positive ef-
fects on earnings and labor force participation (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012,
2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015).
Evidence on the impact of stricter enforcement policies on the number and locational
choices of unauthorized immigrants is based largely on Arizona. Arizona’s population of
non-naturalized citizens fell dramatically after the state’s E-Verify mandate went into ef-
fect in 2007 (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2015; Bohn et al. 2014). The decrease was
concentrated among less-educated and Hispanic immigrants. One study suggests that
many of these immigrants left the USA altogether rather than moved to other states, per-
haps because they were deported (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano 2014). Other research,
however, indicates an increase in migration from Arizona to other states (Ellis et al. 2014).
It is unclear whether a later anti-unauthorized immigration law (SB 1070) passed in
Arizona in 2010 further reduced the state’s population of unauthorized immigrants. A sur-
vey of undocumented migrants along the border in Mexico suggests that the flow of un-
documented migrants planning to enter Arizona fell by 30 to 70 % after the bill was
passed, but undocumented immigrants already living in Arizona did not return to Mexico
in large numbers (Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman 2014). US population data suggest little
effect of SB 1070 on the number of unauthorized immigrants in Arizona (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Lozano 2015). Evidence beyond Arizona on state omnibus immigration
laws, many of which included a universal E-Verify mandate, suggests a sizable drop in the
population of unauthorized immigrants in states that adopted such laws (Good 2013).1
This paper examines the effect of state E-Verify mandates on the population of
unauthorized immigrants. The next section explains how E-Verify works and where it
has been implemented. We then discuss the data and empirical methodology. In
addition to examining population size, we look at population dynamics to try to under-
stand whether any observed population changes are due to interstate mobility. Previous
research has not examined these questions beyond the case of Arizona, whereas we
examine all states that have adopted a universal E-Verify mandate. Our results indicate
that requiring employers to use E-Verify has a large negative effect on the number of
unauthorized immigrants in a state. The results are not driven by any single state and
do not appear to be driven by labor market conditions for less-skilled workers or for
Hispanic immigrants in general. E-Verify laws appear to divert some new unauthorized
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immigrants to other states and to cause some unauthorized immigrants already present
in the USA to leave the country entirely.
2 Background on E-Verify
The employment eligibility verification laws that we examine require virtually all em-
ployers to use E-Verify. E-Verify is a free online system created and managed by the
federal government. It was first rolled out to several states in 1997 under the name
Basic Pilot. It became available to employers in all states in 2003, but participation
remained voluntary. Employers who use E-Verify enter the new worker’s information
on the employment eligibility form (“Form I-9”), and E-Verify compares that informa-
tion with Social Security Administration (SSA) and, if needed, Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) records. If there is a discrepancy, the employer is notified of a
tentative non-confirmation and is told to notify the worker, who then has 8 federal
work days to contest the discrepancy. During those 8 days, the employer cannot fire
the worker because of the discrepancy; however, the employer must fire the worker if
the discrepancy is not resolved after that period.
Employers may disclose that they participate in E-Verify, but they are not allowed to
verify applicants’ eligibility before making a job offer. Unauthorized workers can pass
E-Verify only by committing identity fraud—by supplying another person’s valid Social
Security number and name. In response to this concern, DHS added a photo matching
tool in 2009 and now requires the employer, when possible, to verify that the photo in
E-Verify is identical to the photo the employee presented when completing Form I-9.
However, driver’s licenses—which most workers present as their photo identificatio-
n—are not currently included in the DHS database.
In 2007, Arizona became the first state to require virtually all employers to use E-
Verify. Six other states later adopted universal E-Verify laws, as listed in Table 1.2 These
laws require employers to use E-Verify for new hires, not for existing employees. In
2009, the federal government began requiring some government contractors and sub-
contractors to use E-Verify for new and existing workers assigned to a federal contract.
Several other states have adopted E-Verify laws that cover government employees and/
or government contractors, which are not listed in the table and are not our focus.
Laws that cover government employees are considerably less likely to affect






Alabama June 2011 April 2012 Government contractors only in January–March 2012
Arizona July 2007 January 2008
Georgia May 2011 January 2012 Size phase in
Mississippi March 2008 July 2008 Size phase in
North Carolina June 2011 October 2012 Size phase in
South Carolina June 2011 January 2012
Utah March 2010 July 2010 Government employees and government contractors
only in July 2009–June 2010
Source: Based on http://www.troutmansanders.com/immigration/. Government contractors means businesses with state
contracts (and their subcontractors in most states; conditional on contract size in some states). Only laws that require the
use of E-Verify and do not offer another option, such as certifying or affirming employment eligibility, are listed here.
Policies that apply to only government employees or contractors are not listed here except as noted
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unauthorized immigrants than universal laws since relatively few immigrants work in
the public sector. E-Verify laws that cover government contractors have greater poten-
tial to affect unauthorized immigrants than laws that cover government employees, but
less than universal laws.
3 Data
We use data from the 2005–2014 American Community Survey (ACS), a large-scale
survey of the US population.3 The ACS surveys about 1 % of US households each year;
it replaced the long-form decennial census but is administered on a continuous basis
instead of every 10 years. Households answer questions about members’ demographic
characteristics, including country of birth, year of entry into the USA, and US citizen-
ship status.
Ideally, we would identify immigrants in the ACS who are unauthorized. However, the
ACS does not ask about legal status. We therefore infer whether immigrants are likely to
be unauthorized based on their age, education, country of birth and US citizenship sta-
tus.4 Most unauthorized immigrants to the USA are prime-aged because they migrate in
order to work. Most have relatively little education because they are from countries with
low average levels of educational attainment. In addition, unauthorized immigrants are
typically only able to get jobs in less-skilled sectors, such as agriculture, construction,
manufacturing, and leisure and hospitality. This reduces the incentive for more-educated
people to migrate illegally. About three - quarters of adult unauthorized immigrants have
no more education than a high school degree (Passel and Cohn 2009). Because of
geographic proximity and poor economic and social conditions at home, as well as
extensive migrant networks, more than two - thirds of unauthorized immigrants in
the USA are from Mexico and Central America. Unauthorized immigrants are not eli-
gible for US citizenship.
We define likely unauthorized immigrants here as immigrants aged 20–54 who have
at most completed high school, are from Mexico or Central America, and are not US
citizens.5 Of course, some people in the group we examine are legally present in the
USA. Our estimates therefore may reflect the lower bound of the effect of E-Verify
laws. However, migration often occurs as a family unit. A legal immigrant who is mar-
ried to an unauthorized immigrant may also move in response to E-Verify laws. More
than three - quarters of married-with-spouse-present, less-educated, prime-age, non-
US citizen immigrants from Mexico or Central America in the ACS are married to an-
other likely unauthorized immigrant.6
In addition to reporting estimates for all likely unauthorized immigrants, we report
estimates by recency of arrival in the USA. We divide migrants into three mutually ex-
clusive groups: non-recent immigrants, who arrived in the country more than 5 years
ago; recent immigrants, who arrived 1 to 5 years ago; and new immigrants, who arrived
within the last year.7 Recent immigrants are more likely to be unauthorized than non-
recent immigrants. We therefore expect that any effects of E-Verify on locational
choices are larger among recent immigrants. In addition, recent immigrants’ locational
choices are more likely to respond to E-Verify mandates. Recent immigrants have not
yet put down as many roots that limit mobility, such as having children enrolled in
school or owning a house.
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New immigrants’ locational choices are likely to be particularly sensitive to E-Verify
mandates since they may have the fewest roots in the USA and they need to find a job.
As Borjas (2001) points out, new arrivals tend to be more responsive to geographic dif-
ferences in economic opportunities because they have a lower marginal cost than earl-
ier immigrants or US natives of moving to any particular state since they are coming
from abroad.
We also report baseline regression results below for immigrants who have at least
attended some college and for less-educated US natives. For comparability with our
sample of likely unauthorized immigrants, we include only prime-age adults in these
groups, and the sample of more-educated immigrants is restricted to those who are not
naturalized citizens and are from Mexico and Central America. These groups serve as a
check on whether we are capturing effects of E-Verify laws instead of other factors.
Finding similar effects among likely unauthorized immigrants and these groups would
suggest we are capturing something other than the effects of E-Verify laws. However,
E-Verify laws may have an indirect effect on these groups if employers turn to them in-
stead of to unauthorized immigrants. We therefore may observe in-migration effects
among more-educated immigrants or less-educated natives if E-Verify laws lead to bet-
ter labor market opportunities for those groups.8 On the other hand, effects may not
be positive among US-born Hispanics if E-Verify laws lead to discrimination against
them. There is a precedent for this: Labor market outcomes worsened among US-born
Hispanics after the 1986 IRCA made it illegal to hire unauthorized immigrants (Dávila
et al. 1998). In addition, some more-educated immigrants or less-educated natives may
move in response to E-Verify laws that affect an unauthorized-immigrant spouse.
4 Methodology
We first examine the effect of the E-Verify mandates on population size using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression models of the basic form
ln Populationst ¼ α þ β1E‐Verifyst þ β2Economic Conditionsst−1
þ States þ Yeart þ Trendst þ εst ;
ð1Þ
where s indexes states and t indexes time (year). The dependent variable is the natural
log of a measure of population size.9 E-Verify is the fraction of the year that a state has
a universal E-Verify mandate in effect. We use the fraction of the year that an E-Verify
mandate is in effect because we do not know the month that people were surveyed and
some of the laws went into effect mid-year. We report results from specifications that
measure E-Verify at time t or at time t−1, the previous year, since unauthorized immi-
grants may not move immediately in response to implementation of E-Verify.
Economic conditions include several controls for state-level business cycle conditions:
the natural log of real state GDP per capita; the unemployment rate; the natural log of
real state and local government spending per capita; the number of housing construc-
tion permits; and the number of housing starts. The last two variables are proxies for
the level of construction activity in a state and are included because construction is an
important employment sector for unauthorized immigrant men. The measures of eco-
nomic conditions are lagged 1 year since migration decisions are likely to be based on
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conditions that prevailed in the recent past. Results for those variables are not reported
here but are available on request.
The regressions include state and time fixed effects that control for unobservable
state- or year-specific factors that affect population size. The year fixed effects capture
the national business cycle or other changes common to all states, such as the imple-
mentation of the federal E-Verify law in 2009. The regressions also include state-
specific linear time trends to control for underlying trends. We caution that these trend
variables may capture part of any effect of the mandates since some mandates coin-
cided with the recession and a general decline in the unauthorized immigrant popula-
tion. The data are weighted using the sum of the ACS person weights for a given cell.
The estimated standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Our identification scheme compares the size of the likely unauthorized immigrant
population before and after states implemented E-Verify. Because the regressions in-
clude state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific time trends, the esti-
mated coefficients on E-Verify measure whether the population size changed within a
state after it implemented E-Verify, controlling for the linear trend in the state’s
unauthorized immigrant population and for the business cycle. States that have not
adopted E-Verify do not contribute to the identification of the coefficient on the E-
Verify variable, but they do help identify the coefficients on the business cycle con-
trols and the year fixed effects.
This approach assumes that whether a state implements E-Verify is unrelated to the
size of its unauthorized immigrant population and factors that affect population size,
controlling for business cycle conditions in that state. In other words, it assumes that
E-Verify mandates are exogenous. The state fixed effects capture any time-invariant dif-
ferences across states that might attract unauthorized immigrants, while the state-
specific time trends capture any linear trends in a state that might attract unauthorized
immigrants. Non-linear trends are not captured, however. If unmeasured non-linear
changes in the state attract unauthorized immigrants, which in turn leads the state to
implement E-Verify, the estimated coefficient on the E-Verify variable is biased up-
wards, or too positive. Although not a conclusive test for exogeneity, we separately
examine whether the population size of likely unauthorized immigrants is related to
whether a state adopted E-Verify.
One of the key questions regarding state-level E-Verify laws is whether they lead to a
decrease in the total number of unauthorized immigrants in the USA or just a realloca-
tion of unauthorized immigrants across states. We use several techniques to examine
whether unauthorized immigrants already in the country move to other states in re-
sponse to E-Verify laws and whether newly arriving unauthorized immigrants are
diverted to other states.
First, we examine the effect of E-Verify policies in other states on the number of
likely unauthorized immigrants in a given state. These models allow us to look for spill-
overs onto other states and are based on the assumption that E-Verify laws divert more
unauthorized immigrants to nearby states rather than to geographically distant states.
As discussed in more detail below, we look at two measures of nearby states: states that
share a border and a distance-weighted measure of all states. Migration costs are likely
to be lower to nearby states than to more distant ones, and immigrants may have better
information about opportunities in nearby states than in more distant ones. The
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models are similar to Eq. (1) but add a variable measuring the presence of E-Verify in
other states:
ln Populationst ¼ α þ β1E‐Verifyst þ β2E‐Verify in Nearby Statesst
þ β3Economic Conditionsst−1 þ States þ Yeart
þ Trendst þ εst :
ð2Þ
If E-Verify laws cause immigrants to relocate to non-E-Verify states, β2 will be posi-
tive. As before, we estimate the regression using either contemporaneous or year-ago
E-Verify laws.
Second, we examine the effect of E-Verify on mobility among likely unauthorized im-
migrants. The ACS asks where people lived 1 year ago. We use those answers to count
the number of likely unauthorized immigrants in four groups: stayers (people who lived
in the state this year and last year); domestic in-migrants (people who moved to that
state from another state); international in-migrants (people who moved to that state
from abroad); and domestic out-migrants (people who moved from that state to an-
other state).10 We examine the relationship between the presence of an E-Verify law in
a state last year or this year and migration into and out of that state by applying Eq. (1)
to the number of immigrants in each of these four groups.
5 Results
We first examine the effect of E-Verify on the size of the likely unauthorized immigrant
population—less-educated, prime-age, non-US citizen immigrants from Mexico and
Central America—using OLS regressions to estimate Eq. (1). Table 2 reports the results.
The presence of a universal E-Verify mandate last year has a significant negative effect
on the number of likely unauthorized immigrants who arrived 1 to 5 years ago (row 1,
column 3). The estimated effects for likely unauthorized immigrants as a whole, non-
recent immigrants, and new immigrants are also negative but not significantly different
from zero. The results suggest the number of recent immigrants falls by almost 40 % if
a state had a universal E-Verify law in effect all last year.
The presence of an E-Verify mandate this year has a significant negative effect on the
number of likely unauthorized immigrants overall and the numbers of recent and new
likely unauthorized immigrants. Although the estimates are less precise, they suggest
that the effect of having an E-Verify mandate a year ago on the number of all and re-
cent likely unauthorized immigrants is larger than the effect of having a mandate this
year. This suggests that some immigrants already present in the USA respond with a
Table 2 The effect of E-Verify laws on likely unauthorized immigrant population size
All Not recent Recent New
A. E-Verify last year −0.096 (0.062) −0.069 (0.046) −0.385*** (0.080) −0.229 (0.162)
B. E-Verify this year −0.061** (0.023) −0.026 (0.026) −0.258*** (0.071) −0.464* (0.259)
N 510 510 510 510
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state. The dependent variable is logged. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include
the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state
government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time
trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are
robust and clustered on state
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lag to E-Verify mandates. They may need to experience adverse consequences in the
labor market, such as not easily being able to switch jobs, before leaving a state that
has enacted an E-Verify mandate. New immigrants, in contrast, appear to be more re-
sponsive to the contemporaneous presence of a law than to the presence of a law a year
ago. This makes sense if immigrants newly arriving in the country are more forward
looking than immigrants already present in the country.
If the sample is restricted to likely unauthorized immigrant men who are not married
with a spouse present—a group particularly likely to be unauthorized (Caponi and
Plesca 2014)—most of the results are even larger (in absolute value) than those re-
ported in Table 2.11 Notably, the number of new likely unauthorized immigrants falls
by more than 50 % (a result that is statistically significant at the 1 % level) when a state
has an E-Verify law in effect all of the current year.
No particular state appears to drive the results. We generally find similar results
when dropping, one by one, each of the seven states that adopted a universal E-Verify
law during 2005–2014. Table 3 shows the results for specifications with the contempor-
aneous E-Verify variable. The top row reproduces the result with all states. The nega-
tive effect for new likely unauthorized immigrants is smaller and no longer statistically
significant if Arizona is dropped from the sample, while the negative effect for non-
recent immigrants becomes significant. This suggests that new immigrants particularly
avoided Arizona after that state became the first one to adopt a universal E-Verify law,
but long-time immigrants did not leave the state in large numbers.
It is possible that federal immigration enforcement efforts are not entirely captured
by the year fixed effects and are correlated with state E-Verify laws, driving some of the
observed population changes. To test this, we added a regional measure of the number
of immigrant removals during 2005–2013.12 The results are robust to controlling for
the number of immigrants ordered removed by federal immigration courts, most of
whom are unauthorized immigrants. The number of immigrants ordered removed is
positively related to the number of recent and new likely unauthorized immigrants, as
expected if areas with more unauthorized immigrants experience more removals.
Table 3 Robustness of estimates to dropping individual states with an E-Verify law
All Not recent Recent New
A. All states −0.061** (0.023) −0.026 (0.026) −0.258*** (0.071) −0.464* (0.259)
N 510 510 510 510
B. Without Alabama −0.043*** (0.013) −0.017 (0.026) −0.212*** (0.059) −0.463* (0.266)
C. Without Arizona −0.060* (0.033) −0.050* (0.028) −0.306*** (0.093) −0.055 (0.180)
D. Without Georgia −0.070** (0.034) −0.024 (0.040) −0.233** (0.102) −0.629*** (0.219)
E. Without Mississippi −0.062** (0.023) −0.029 (0.027) −0.256*** (0.074) −0.469* (0.265)
F. Without North Carolina −0.060* (0.030) −0.015 (0.029) −0.247*** (0.086) −0.514* (0.290)
G. Without South Carolina −0.057** (0.024) −0.014 (0.025) −0.279*** (0.079) −0.514* (0.277)
H. Without Utah −0.069*** (0.022) −0.032 (0.025) −0.280*** (0.069) −0.456* (0.270)
N 500 500 500 500
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state. The dependent variable is logged. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions in-
clude the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real
state government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time
trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are ro-
bust and clustered on state
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However, controlling for this variable has little effect on the relationship between a
state’s E-Verify law and the number of likely unauthorized immigrants. Further, the
presence of an E-Verify law is not significantly related to the number of immigrants or-
dered removed in a state if specifications similar to Eq. (1) are estimated with the log of
removals as the dependent variable. It is worth noting that most removals occur at the
US-Mexico border and, as a result, the great majority of very recently arrived immi-
grants who are deported never show up in surveys like the ACS.
The results are also robust to controlling for the presence of state-wide 287(g) agree-
ments.13 These agreements delegated federal authority to enforce immigration laws to
local law enforcement officials.14 In essence, likely unauthorized immigrants who come
into contact with the police in areas with a 287(g) agreement may be reported to Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement and then detained and eventually deported. Control-
ling for whether a state has signed a 287(g) agreement does not affect the relationship
between E-Verify laws and the number of likely unauthorized immigrants. Interestingly,
we do not find that having a 287(g) agreement in place significantly reduces the num-
ber of likely unauthorized immigrants in a state.
Table 4 shows the results of specifications similar to Table 2 for our comparison
groups: more-educated, prime-age, non-naturalized immigrants from Mexico and
Central America and less-educated US natives. As expected, the presence of an E-
Verify law last year or this year is not significantly related to the population size of
these groups. Further, the estimated coefficients for US natives (columns 5–7) are
very small, indicating the laws do not affect natives’ locational choices. This suggests
that our regressions capture the effect of E-Verify laws rather than factors that affect all
non-naturalized immigrants from Mexico and Central America or all low-skilled workers.
Another way to examine the validity of our empirical approach is to look at the ef-
fect of non-universal E-Verify laws. As discussed earlier, some states enacted E-Verify
requirements that apply only to government employees or contractors. Table 5 shows
the estimated effects of E-Verify laws that cover government employees and contrac-
tors as well as the effects of universal laws on the number of likely unauthorized im-
migrants in a state; for brevity, we only report results for contemporaneous laws. We
also look at effects on less-educated US natives since these laws may increase demand
for US-born workers who are substitutes for immigrants.
The results indicate that E-Verify requirements for government employees and gov-
ernment contractors have relatively little effect on the number of likely unauthorized
Table 4 The effect of E-Verify laws on comparison groups’ population size
More-educated immigrants Less-educated US natives
All Not recent Recent New Whites Blacks Hispanics




























N 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state. The dependent variable is logged. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions
include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real
state government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time
trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are
robust and clustered on state
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immigrants or less-educated US natives in a state. This is not surprising since relatively
few unauthorized immigrants are directly affected by those laws. Laws affecting govern-
ment employees have a small negative effect on the total number of likely unauthorized
immigrants (row 1, column 1), while laws covering government contractors appear to
boost the number of long-term immigrants (row 2, column 2) and less-educated black
natives (row 2, column 6) in a state. As the bottom row of the table reports, universal
laws continue to reduce the number of all, recent, and new likely unauthorized immi-
grants in a state when controlling for other types of E-Verify laws, which five of the seven
states with a universal mandate had before putting a universal mandate into effect.15
The effect of E-Verify laws on the number of unauthorized immigrants in a state may
increase or decrease over time. It may take a while for unauthorized immigrants to
learn about E-Verify laws or to be affected by them, in which case the effect may in-
crease over time. Alternatively, unauthorized immigrants (and their employers) may
initially react to E-Verify laws but learn over time that the laws are not strictly enforced
or are easily evaded. To examine the effect of E-Verify over time, we added to Eq. (1) a
variable that measures the number of years that a universal E-Verify law has been in
place; the variable equals zero the first year a law is in effect and increases by one each
subsequent year.
Table 6 reports the regressions results. The negative effect of E-Verify on the number
of recent immigrants grows significantly over time (column 3). For new arrivals, in
Table 5 The effect of different types of E-Verify laws on population size
Likely unauthorized immigrants Less-educated US natives











































N 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on a variable measuring the fraction of the year that an E-Verify law covering
government employees, government contractors, or all workers was in effect in a state. The dependent variable is
logged. Each column is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the
unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all
lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the
sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state
Table 6 The effect of E-Verify laws on likely unauthorized immigrant population size over time
All Not recent Recent New
















N 510 510 510 510
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state and the number of years it has been in effect. The dependent variable is logged. Each column is from
a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, housing
permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year
fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person weights in the
population group
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contrast, the effect does not change significantly over time—the drop in the number of
newly arriving likely unauthorized immigrants appears to be sustained but not to grow
over time (column 4). However, the more-negative effect over time among recent im-
migrants may be partly mechanical.16 Since new arrivals in year t are recent immigrants
in years t + 1 through t + 5, the large, sustained drop in the number of newly arriving
likely unauthorized immigrants is likely to translate into a negative effect on the num-
ber of recent likely unauthorized immigrants that grows over time. In any case, we cau-
tion that only three states had E-Verify laws in place for more than 3 years in our
sample: Arizona, Mississippi, and Utah. A longer time period for more states is needed
to better understand how the effect of E-Verify changes over time.
5.1 Does the number of unauthorized immigrants affect E-Verify law adoption?
The seven states that adopted universal E-Verify mandates are all relatively conservative
states located in the South or Southwest. To varying degrees, these states experienced
an influx of immigrants during the 1990s and early 2000s. However, some other states
that also experienced an influx of immigrants during that period did not adopt universal
E-Verify laws. Many of those states are in the Midwest and also tend to lean Republican.
Determining exactly what caused some states to adopt E-Verify laws is beyond the scope
of this paper, but we briefly address whether increases in the population of likely
unauthorized immigrants caused states to adopt a universal E-Verify law. To do this, we
estimate regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if a state adopted a
universal E-Verify law that year. The regressions include the log level or the growth
rate of the population of all, non-recent, recent, or new likely unauthorized immi-
grants, our lagged measures of economic conditions, state and year fixed effects, and
state-specific time trends.
As shown in Table 7, none of the results indicate that having a larger number of likely
unauthorized immigrants or a faster growth rate of that population caused states to adopt
E-Verify.17 Although not conclusive proof that the adoption of E-Verify is exogenous, the
results suggest that something other than changes in the population of unauthorized
immigrants or factors that led to changes in that population caused states to adopt E-Verify.
Table 7 The effect of likely unauthorized immigrant population size on E-Verify law adoption
All Not recent Recent New








N 459 459 459 459








N 510 510 510 510








N 459 459 459 459
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on the log of the population size. The dependent variable indicates whether a
state adopted a universal E-Verify law that year. Each entry is from a separate OLS regression. The estimated coefficients
shown in row 3 are multiplied by 1000. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per capita, the unemployment
rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per capita (all lagged 1 year);
state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted using the sum of the person
weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state
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5.2 Evidence on spillovers
To determine whether E-Verify laws reduce the total population of unauthorized immi-
grants or just reallocate them across states, we first examine spillovers, or whether E-
Verify laws in other states affect the number of likely unauthorized immigrants living
in a given state. To do this, we construct two measures of E-Verify laws in other states:
the fraction of bordering states with a universal E-Verify law in effect and a distance-
weighted measure of the presence of universal E-Verify laws in other states that gives
less weight to states that are further away. As in Eq. (2), the regressions include one of
those two variables and a variable measuring the presence of E-Verify in a given state
that year.
Table 8 gives the results. The presence of E-Verify in other states does not appear to
increase the number of all, non-recent, or recent likely unauthorized immigrants in a
given state, but it does boost the number of new likely unauthorized immigrants in a
given state. The number of new likely unauthorized immigrants in a state is about 57 %
higher if every contiguous state has E-Verify (panel A, column 4). The distance-
weighted measure also indicates a positive effect, although its coefficient does not lend
itself to a clear interpretation because of the weighting scheme (panel B, column 4).
Both measures thus suggest that E-Verify laws divert some new arrivals to other states.
Meanwhile, immigrants who are already settled in the USA do not appear to move to
nearby states in response to E-Verify laws. In fact, the fraction of bordering states with
E-Verify is negatively related to the number of non-recent likely unauthorized immi-
grants in a state (panel A, column 2). This result may be an artifact of the geographic
clustering of states that adopted E-Verify laws.
Our failure to find that E-Verify mandates increase the number of already-present
likely unauthorized immigrants in nearby states does not necessarily mean that they
leave the country entirely when a state requires E-Verify. Instead, they may relocate in
a pattern unrelated to the distance from E-Verify states. We therefore turn next to an
analysis of mobility patterns among likely unauthorized immigrants.
Table 8 The effect of own and other states’ E-Verify laws on likely unauthorized immigrant
population size
All Not recent Recent New
A. Own state and fraction of bordering states
















B. Own state and distance-weighted fraction of
other states














N 510 510 510 510
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state and a measure of E-Verify in bordering states or in all other states. The dependent variable is logged.
Each set of two coefficients is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per
capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per
capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted
using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state
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5.3 Mobility
In a final effort to determine how E-Verify laws affect the number of unauthorized im-
migrants, we examine the effect of universal E-Verify laws on the number of likely
unauthorized immigrants who stay in a state, the number who migrate to a state from
other states and from abroad, and the number who leave a state in order to migrate to
another state. Table 9 shows the regression results for these four groups. Looking first
at stayers, the presence of an E-Verify law in a state last year reduces the total number
of likely unauthorized immigrants who stay in that state by about 10 % (row 1, column
1). This result is driven by recent immigrants—the number of recent immigrants who
remain in a state is almost 40 % lower if a state had a universal E-Verify law last year
(row 1, column 3). The contemporaneous presence of an E-Verify law also reduces the
number of stayers (row 2), although the effects are slightly smaller.
The presence of an E-Verify law last year or this year does not affect the number of
in-migrants from other states, as panel B reports. Panel C reproduces the results for
new immigrants as those are the number of in-migrants from abroad. The presence of
an E-Verify law this year reduces the number of in-migrants from abroad. The number
of non-recent likely unauthorized immigrants who left a state is lower if a state had an
E-Verify law last year; this result is the opposite of the expected effect if E-Verify laws
cause unauthorized immigrants to leave. However, a relatively low share of non-recent
immigrants is unauthorized compared with the two other time-since-migration groups
we examine here. More of the non-recent group is presumably made up of documented
Table 9 The effect of E-Verify laws on likely unauthorized immigrants’ mobility
All Not recent Recent and new
A. Remain in state












B. In-migration from other states












C. In-migration from abroad








D. Out-migration to other states












N 510 510 510
*p < 0.1; ***p < 0.01
Note: Shown are estimated coefficients on variables measuring the fraction of the year that a universal E-Verify law was
in effect in a state and a measure of E-Verify in bordering states or in all other states. The dependent variable is logged.
Each set of two coefficients is from a separate OLS regression. The regressions include the log of state real GDP per
capita, the unemployment rate, housing permits, housing starts, and the log of real state government expenditures per
capita (all lagged 1 year); state and year fixed effects; and state-specific linear time trends. Observations are weighted
using the sum of the person weights in the population group. Standard errors are robust and clustered on state
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immigrants, who may benefit from E-Verify laws that reduce competition in the labor
market.
The results in Table 9 do not indicate major migration across states by unauthorized
immigrants already present in the USA. If so, we would expect to observe a negative ef-
fect on in-migration from other states and a positive effect on out-migration to other
states. We do not observe such effects. This is consistent with the failure to find posi-
tive effects of other states’ policies on the number of long-time and recent immigrants
in a given state in Table 8. Yet E-Verify laws cause the number of likely unauthorized
immigrants who remain in a state to fall, as shown in Table 9, and the population of re-
cent likely unauthorized immigrants to decline, as shown in Table 2. Taken as a whole,
the results here thus suggest that most of the drop in the number of already-present
unauthorized immigrants in states that adopt universal E-Verify laws is due to them
leaving the USA entirely.
6 Conclusions
The results here point to several conclusions: First, E-Verify laws reduce the number of
unauthorized immigrants in a state. This effect tends to be concentrated among recent
arrivals and is particularly large for newly arriving immigrants. Second, the evidence
suggests that E-Verify laws divert some newly arriving unauthorized immigrants to
other states. The number of new likely unauthorized immigrants rises in a state as
more nearby states begin requiring employers to use E-Verify.
Among immigrants already present in the country, however, we do not find evidence
of migration to other states in response to E-Verify laws. This suggests that at least
some of these immigrants—and perhaps many of them—leave the country entirely.
However, the American Community Survey data that we use here do not allow us to
directly examine immigrants who leave the USA entirely. The survey also does not ask
about legal status, which we proxy using age, education, place of birth, and reported
US citizenship status. Data that include legal status and that encompass people who
leave the USA would give a more complete understanding of whether unauthorized im-
migrants leave in response to employment eligibility verification laws. Nonetheless, our
results together with previous findings that E-Verify laws and other enforcement mea-
sures generally lead to worse labor market outcomes among likely unauthorized immi-
grants may give policymakers additional reason to consider adopting such policies if
they hope to reduce the number of unauthorized immigrants in the USA and are not
concerned about adverse effects on those who remain.
Endnotes
1Several studies examine another type of enforcement policy that may affect
unauthorized immigrants’ locational choices: 287(g) agreements, which delegate federal
authority to enforce immigration laws to local law enforcement officials. Having a
287(g) program nearly doubles the propensity of immigrants to move within the USA;
surprisingly, the effect is the greatest among college-educated immigrants, who are not
likely to be unauthorized immigrants (Watson 2013). Growth in the number of His-
panic students slows when local labor market conditions worsen in areas that create a
287(g) program (O’Neil 2011). In addition, states with tougher interior enforcement as
measured using factor analysis on E-Verify enrollment by firms, anti-immigrant state
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laws and 287(g) participation had slower growth in their unauthorized immigrant
population during the 2000s (Leerkes et al. 2012).
2We do not only include states that require employers to use E-Verify but also give
them another option, such as retaining a copy of the documents used to complete
Form I-9; Louisiana and Tennessee have such laws. Including those states as mandatory
E-Verify states gives estimated coefficients that are closer to zero, as expected if those
laws have little effect.
3We use IPUMS data from Ruggles et al. (2015).
4Studies conclude that the ACS and similar surveys include unauthorized immigrants to
a significant extent, although they are undercounted (e.g., Hanson 2006; Massey 2013).
5Although some unauthorized immigrants may report being naturalized citizens in
the ACS, we do not examine naturalized citizens since the share that is unauthorized
immigrants is presumably very low. We do not include people whose place of birth or
citizenship status was imputed by the ACS. We also do not include people born abroad
to US-citizen parents since they are usually eligible for US citizenship at birth.
6Authors’ own calculations.
7In our sample, about 16 % of all likely unauthorized immigrants arrived 1 to 5 years
ago and another 1.6 % within the last year.
8However, research does not suggest this is the case for less-educated natives in
Arizona (Bohn et al. 2015).
9For cells with zero population in them in the ACS data, we replace them with a
value of 1 before taking the log. The results are similar if those cells are not included in
the regressions.
10We are not able to look directly at international out-migrants since the ACS only
captures people who live in the USA. In theory, this number can be backed out by
comparing the change in a state’s population with the number of in-migrants and the
number of out-migrants to other states. However, such calculations are based on a re-
sidual and require strong assumptions about the ability of the ACS weights to measure
short-run changes in an itinerant population.
11All results discussed but not shown here are available on request.
12Counts of the number of immigrants ordered removed are from Syracuse University’s
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/
court_backlog/court_proctime_outcome.php). Not all states have immigration courts, so
we assign removals across states within jurisdictions based on the distribution of
unauthorized immigrants within each jurisdiction. The results are robust to using distri-
butions that changed each year and distributions from 2005. The distribution of
unauthorized immigrants across states is based on data from Warren and Warren (2013)
and Warren (2014); details available from the authors on request.
13We thank Sarah Bohn for providing us with information on these laws.
14The 287(g) program was only in effect through 2012. Our results are not sensitive
to whether we keep the 287(g) variable equal to 1 or set it equal to 0 after 2012 in
states that had signed a 287(g) agreement.
15The two exceptions are Arizona and Mississippi. In our specification, the public sector
and contractor dummy variables equal zero if the universal mandate variable equals one.
16However, the drop in new immigrants does not drive all of the results. If so, the
initial effect of the laws, as measured by “E-Verify in effect” variable, would be zero.
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This is not the case for recent likely unauthorized immigrants. In addition, if states that
adopt an E-Verify law are included in the sample only the first year that an E-Verify
law goes into effect there, having an E-Verify law remains significantly negatively
related to the number of all and recent likely unauthorized immigrants.
17Consistent with this, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) find that political factors are
more important than changes in the size of the Latino immigrant population in explaining
the proposal and passage of anti-unauthorized immigration measures at the state and
local levels.
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